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On 15 September 2010 the prime ministers of Norway and the Russian Federation 
met in Murmansk and signed an “Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and 
the Russian Federation on Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the 
Polar Ocean” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).1 More than three decades in the 
making, the agreement draws a boundary between the two countries in the Barents 
Sea, continues cooperation in fisheries, and lays the framework for cooperation on 
petroleum deposits straddling the boundary (Henriksen and Ulfstein, 2010). The 
agreement entered into force in July 2011. Its significance goes well beyond the 
Barents Sea, as it demonstrated the capability of Arctic countries to resolve issues in 
a peaceful manner on the basis of international law (Hoel, 2010). The agreement 
settles the most important outstanding foreign policy issues between the two 
countries and opens up new opportunities for cooperation, which is likely to have 
important repercussions also at the domestic level. 
 The purpose of this article is to give a brief overview of the new boundary 
agreement in the Barents Sea, the history of its negotiation and context. Following a 
sketch of the bio-geographical status of the area and a brief account of relevant 
aspects of the law of the sea, the 40 years negotiation process is described, before the 
agreement itself is addressed. The article concludes with some observations on the 
implications of the agreement at various levels of governance. 
 
The Barents Sea 
The Barents Sea is bordered in the west by the Norwegian Sea, and in the east by 
Novaya Zemlya. It stretches from the Norwegian and Russian coasts in the south to 
about 80 °N, covering an area of about 1.4 million km2.2 It is relatively shallow, with 
an average depth of 230 m. An inflow of warm Atlantic water from the southwest 
supports high biological productivity and keeps large parts of the Barents Sea ice-
free year-round.  
 Because the waters are shallow, vertical mixing normally goes down to the bottom 
in winter, bringing nutrients up to the productive surface waters where they sustain 
biological production in spring. Variations in environmental conditions result in 
large seasonal and inter-annual fluctuations in the production of phyto- and 
zooplankton and therefore in the food for fish, seabirds and marine mammals 
(Wassman et al., 2006).  
 There are more than 200 fish species in the Barents Sea (Sakshaug et al., 2009) 
Some fish species, such as herring and cod, spend parts of the year or part of their 
                                                            
1 Translated from Norwegian: “Overenskomst mellom Kongeriket Norge og Den Russiske Føderasjon 
om maritim avgrensning og samarbeid i Barentshavet og Polhavet.” 
2 The International Hydrographic Organization (1953) provides a technical definition of the Barents 
Sea.  
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life cycle in the Barents Sea and the rest along the Norwegian mainland coast and in 
the Norwegian Sea. For polar cod and capelin, the Barents Sea is a spawning ground, 
nursery area and feeding area.  
 The high production of plankton and fish in the Barents Sea supports about 25 
million birds, one of the largest seabird colonies in the world.  A number of marine 
mammals forage in the Barents Sea and calve in temperate waters further south, 
while others spend their whole lives in the Arctic.  About 3000 marine species have 
been recorded in the Barents Sea. 
 The main commercial activity in the Barents Sea is fisheries. Important fisheries 
include Northeast Arctic cod, Northeast Arctic haddock, capelin, herring, tusk, ling, 
wolf-fish, deep-sea redfish, Northeast Atlantic Greenland halibut and shrimp and 
king crab. Fisheries in the Barents Sea are dominated by Norway and Russia with 
some catches taken by third countries. Most fisheries are sustainable (Sunnanå, 
2011).  
 Petroleum-related activities are growing. Seismic surveys and exploration drilling 
for oil and gas began in 1980. Up to 2011, about 90 wells have been drilled 
(Petroleum Directorate, 2011, 32). Discoveries are mainly gas, but also some oil has 
been found. The Barents Sea North of 74° 30' is not open for petroleum prospecting.  
 
International law and marine boundary delimitation 
International ocean law specifies the rules for how the oceans and the natural 
resources there are to be divided. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,3 which was 
negotiated during the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1974-
1982), came into force in 1994; more than 160 countries have ratified the treaty.4 
Other important treaties in the context of ocean delimitation include the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention (in force since 1964).  
 The provisions of the law of the sea stipulate who can decide what where. A 
significant aspect of the development of ocean law over the decades is the extension 
of coastal state jurisdiction. The 1982 Convention establishes that coastal states have 
sovereign rights over natural resources in a 200-nautical mile (370-kilometer) 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), calculated from baselines running along the coast. 
In the EEZ, the coastal states have sovereign rights over natural resources and can 
decide how these resources are to be managed and used (Churchill and Lowe, 1999). 
These rights on the part of coastal states are balanced with duties to manage 
resources sustainably and to cooperate with other countries to this end.  
 Beyond the EEZ are the high seas. Here, the basic principle is the freedom of the 
high seas. It is the flag state that has jurisdiction over vessels operating here.   
 Important to the issue of delimitation, the 1982 Convention makes a distinction 
between the water column and the continental shelf. Coastal state jurisdiction over 
the water column ends at the 200- mile boundary. Its jurisdiction on the continental 
shelf, however, extends to where the continental shelf meets the deep seabed. Where 
the continental shelf goes beyond 200 nautical miles, coastal states have to submit 
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information on the outer limits of the continental shelf to the Continental Shelf 
Commission set up by the 1982 Convention. The Commission makes 
recommendations to coastal states on matters related to the establishment of those 
outer limits.   
 In drawing the marine boundaries between countries, the basic rule of international 
law is that delimitation shall be by agreement between the interested states. In the 
absence of such an agreement, certain rules apply: the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention requires boundaries to be based on an equidistance principle. The 
subsequent 1982 Convention establishes that boundary solutions are to be 
“equitable”.  Exactly what “equitable” means is unclear, but state practice and cases 
before international judiciaries5 indicate that, between opposing coasts, an 
equidistance line modified by geographical circumstances is the basic rule for diving 
ocean territories. 
 
Drawing the boundary 
The land boundary between Norway and Russia was concluded in 1826 (Nielsen, 
2005).6 The first, initial steps towards a marine boundary between Norway and the 
then Soviet Union was taken in 1957 by an agreement on the marine boundary in the 
inshore area of Varangerfjord (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  2007).  
 The discussions between the two countries on a marine boundary in the Barents 
Sea were initiated by Norway in 1970, aiming for a delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the Barents Sea. Formal talks between the two countries were taking place 
from 1974 onwards (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, 2), with varying degrees of 
intensity. With the developments in international ocean law during the 1970´s and 
the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones by Norway in 1977 and the Soviet 
Union the following year, the talks also came to include also a boundary for the EEZ 
(water) and not only the continental shelf. 
 The two countries had different ideas for how the boundary line should be drawn 
(Tresselt, 1988): Norway's position was that the boundary line should to be drawn 
according to the equidistance principle laid down in the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention, with the boundary in equal distance from the land areas on each side. 
The Soviet Union advocated a boundary drawn according to the sector principle, 
along a meridian from the end point of the land boundary between the two countries 
to the North Pole, with adjustments in the Svalbard area.7  
 The resulting disputed area, to the east of the sector line and to the west of the 
equidistance line, was 175 200 km2,  running from the outer limit of the territorial 
waters, between Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya and into the Arctic Ocean (figure 1).  
 
 
                                                            
5 Such as the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. The 
Law of the Sea Convention establishes the latter. 
6 It has remained in force since, except for the period 1920 - 1945 when Finland established a corridor 
between the two. 
7 In 1926, the Soviet Union declared all territories to the north of the Soviet Union up to the North 
Pole as belonging to the Soviet Union. The claim was bounded in the west by a line running along the 
32o 04´ east meridian, adjusted to 35o  East between 74 and 81o North, in order to include islands of the 
Svalbard archipelago which were under Norwegian sovereignty by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. 
18 Hoel, The 2010 Norway – Russia Marine Boundary Agreement 
 



























Figure 1: The disputed area. 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. 
 
In absence of a boundary, there was a need for arrangement for the enforcement of 
fisheries regulations towards third countries in the disputed area. Norway and the 
Soviet Union could enforce regulations towards their own vessels. But in order to 
exercise control over the fishery from vessels from third countries, it was necessary 
to establish an arrangement where Norway enforced regulations towards third 
countries it had licensed, and Russia likewise. A so-called “Grey Zone” of 67 000 
km2 was established for this purpose. The arrangement was heavily criticized in 
Norway for being unbalanced in favor of the Soviet Union (Østreng, 1982).8 
 Also, in the northeastern part of the Barents Sea a large area of 55 000 km2 
remained outside the EEZs of the two countries. These waters are high seas, beyond 
the jurisdiction of the two coastal states. Fisheries in this “Loophole” have been 
nearly non-existent, except during the 1990s when a substantial cod fishery took 
place for about 5 years.  It was terminated through international agreements between 
the two coastal states and Iceland, whose vessels was behind most of the fishery in 
the Loophole (Schram Stokke, 2001). 
                                                            
8 The agreement covered an area with 23 000 km2 in undisputed Norwegian waters and 3 000 km2 in 
undisputed Soviet waters. Hence, it was considered imbalanced my many observers in Norway. 
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 The talks over the years had their ups and downs. At the height of the cold war, 
the small state Norway was skeptical to Soviet intentions. Repeated proposals from 
the Soviet Union for arrangements that entailed some form of co-management of the 
disputed area or parts of it were rejected by Norway, who has consistently worked 
for a clear and unambiguous boundary (Kvalvik, 2004; Churchill and Ulfstein, 
1992). 
 The end of the cold war gradually brought a better climate for negotiating a 
border. General cooperation between the two countries increased in several respects, 
and the regional Barents cooperation contributed to enhance the general trust and 
cooperation among nations in the North. A state visit by President V Putin in 2002 
provided a new impetus for reaching an agreement, and an agreements between the 
foreign ministers J G Støre and S Lavrov in 2006 signalled intensified efforts 
towards a final agreement.  
 In 2007 an Agreement on a boundary in the Varangerfjord area (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007)) was adopted, entering into force 9 July 2008. This 
agreement, building on the 1957 agreement, draws the boundary from the endpoint 
of the  land boundary and 73 km seawards to where the sector and equidistance lines 
intersect, signaled that something substantial was in works.  
 In parallel with these developments, Norway and Russia were following up on the 
provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention regarding the delimitation of their outer 
continental shelves. Russia, with its enormous Arctic coastline, submitted its 
information on the geological properties of its continental shelf to the Continental 
Shelf Commission in 2001, and Norway followed suit in 2006 (CLCS, 2009). The 
Commission has asked for more information from Russia, who intend to resubmit its 
geological information in 2012.9 The commission adopted recommendations on the 
outer limits of the Norwegian continental shelf in 2009, the first country in the Arctic 
costal states. The Commission recommendations clarified that the entire Barents Sea 
is continental shelf and therefore under the jurisdiction of the two.  
 Also relevant to the process towards and agreed boundary was an increasing 
international political attention to the Arctic, driven by prospects for natural 
resources (Brigham, 2011). This led to increasing contact between the coastal states 
in the region, producing the 2009 Ilulissat Declaration (Anon 2008) stating that the 
five coastal states to the central Arctic Ocean are committed to the legal framework 
provided by the Law of the Sea Convention and that they would work for the orderly 
settlement of any possible overlapping claims. 
 
The agreed boundary 
After nearly 40 years of talks, on 27 April 2010 Norway and Russia announced that 
they had agreed to a boundary in the Barents Sea. The occasion was a state visit by 
president V Medvedev, and the joint “Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and 
cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean” of 27 April 2010 spelled out 
the broad terms of the agreement. The opening paragraph describes the motivation 
for the agreement thus: 
 
                                                            
9 According to a report in Barents Observer, 13 December 2011. 
http://www.barentsobserver.com/russias-arctic-shelf-bid-90-percent-complete.4997904-116321.html  
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Recognising our mutual determination to strengthen our good neighbourly 
relations, secure stability and enhance cooperation in the Barents Sea and 
the Arctic Ocean, we are pleased to announce that our negotiating 
delegations have reached preliminary agreement on the bilateral maritime 
delimitation between our two countries in these areas, which has been the 
object of extensive negotiations over the years.10 
 
The actual agreement was signed by prime minister J Stoltenberg of Norway and 
prime minister V Putin of Russia in Murmansk on 15 September 2010. The 
Norwegian Storting debated the agreement during winter 2011 and the Russian 
Duma in spring. With the conclusion of ratification procedures the agreement entered 
into force on 7 July 2011. 
 The agreed boundary divides the disputed area of 175 200 km2 into two equal 
parts of approximately 87 600 km2, with a boundary line 1,680 kilometers long. The 
total boundary from endpoint of land boundary in Varanger, including the part 
agreed to in the 2007 agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), is 1750 
kilometers, almost as long as the distance between Oslo and Rome.  
 The entire Barents Sea is a continental shelf, and while the shelf comes under the 
jurisdiction of the two states in its entirety, the waters in the area beyond national 
jurisdiction, the “Loophole”, are high seas. The boundary line on the shelf cuts 
straight through the area beyond national jurisdiction. 
 The Norwegian Government´s proposition to the Storting seeking the consent to 
enter into the agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), states that the 
agreement builds on international law and the rules of international ocean law on 
marine boundary delimitation, in particular articles 74 and 83 of Law of the Sea 
Convention which concerns delimitation of EEZs and continental shelves 
respectively, requiring states to aim for an equitable result in establishing marine 
boundaries. Also, a number of international court cases have provided guidance as to 
methods for delimitation and factors to be taken into account. Particular weight is 
accorded to geographical properties of coastlines and differences in coastal length 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, 6). Socioeconomic factors, size of population, 
etc. are not considered relevant in this regard.  
 In the Barents Sea, the questions relating to factors and methods were complex, 
due to the large disputed area, the complex configuration of the respective coastlines, 
and the existence of a high seas area beyond the EEZs of the two countries. The 
considerably longer Russian coastline resulted therefore in s westward shift of the 
boundary in the southern part of the Barents Sea relative to an equidistant line 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, 6).   
 A special feature of the agreement is a “special area” to the east of the boundary 
drawing the EEZ of Russia further to the North than it was without the agreement. 
This results from Norway consenting to Russian exercise of jurisdiction in an area to 
the east of the boundary line that would have been within the Norwegian EEZ if the 
equidistance line were the boundary.11 
                                                            
10 Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/100427-FellesuutalelseEngelsk.pdf 
11 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 9, for a map and discussion of this. 
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Figure 2: The boundary 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. 
 
The agreed boundary is based on geographical factors, not assumed natural 
resources. But, as indicated by its title, the agreement is not only a boundary 
agreement but also a cooperation agreement. It therefore takes a comprehensive 
approach, spelling out how cooperation on the management of living marine 
resources and petroleum resources is to be organized. 
 
Fisheries 
The Barents Sea is an internationally significant fishing ground, with abundant 
stocks of a number of fish species and marine mammals. Four fish stocks are 
considered shared stocks between the  two countries: cod, haddock, capelin and 
Greenland halibut. A number of other species are also harvested in the area, which is 
important also as a growth area for juvenile herring.12 The centerpiece of the bilateral 
cooperation is a Joint Fisheries Commission which has operated since the mid-1970s 
(Hønneland, 2004).  
                                                            
12 Herring is not fished in the Barents Sea, however. One of the world´s largest fisheries, the herring 
fishery takes place along the coast of Norway as well as in the EEZs of the Faroes and Iceland. 
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 The preamble of the agreement specifically notes that Norway and Russia as 
coastal states have a fundamental interest in and responsibility for the conservation 
and sustainable management of the living marine resources in the Barents Sea and 
the Polar Ocean, in accordance with international law.  
 The provisions of article 4 of the agreement concern fisheries and takes as its point 
of departure that the agreement shall not harm the respective fishing possibilities of 
the two parties. It establishes that the fisheries cooperation between the two 
countries, as laid down in fisheries cooperation agreements from 197513 and 197614, 
is to continue, maintaining the relative shares of the shared fish stocks. Also, in 
managing fisheries, a precautionary approach is to be taken to protect the living 
marine resources and the marine environment.  
 Details regarding this are stipulated in an appendix to the agreement. The 1975 
and 1976 agreements are to remain in force another 15 years, and will thereafter 
remain in force for six year periods unless renounced by one of the parties.15 The 
appendix also contains provisions on technical aspects of fisheries regulations and 
the work of the Joint Fisheries Commission. 
 
Petroleum 
The Barents Sea is generally believed to contain substantial amounts of oil and gas. 
A much-quoted US Geological Survey study from 2008 (USGS, 2008) states the 
Arctic “ accounts for about 13 percent of the undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the 
undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in 
the world. About 84 percent of the estimated resources are expected to occur 
offshore.”16 In the study, the Barents Sea is identified as a region with substantial oil 
and gas reserves. Until now, however, very little commercial petroleum activity has 
taken place in the Barents Sea proper; the Snøhvit field off Finnmark county to the 
southwest of the Barents Sea, which came on stream in 2007, is the closest. The 
Goliat oil field in the same area is expected to come on stream in 2013. In Russia, 
great expectations are vested in the Shtokman field, 600 km to the north of 
Murmansk. This is expected to become one of the largest offshore gas fields in the 
world (Moe, 2010).   
 The agreement emphasizes in its preamble that petroleum resources are to be 
managed effectively. As the case is for fisheries, the agreement contains one article 
laying out the general provisions, and an appendix with the specifics. The point of 
the departure of article 5 on petroleum is that where a petroleum deposit straddles the 
boundary, the provisions in appendix II of the agreement, “Transboundary petroleum 
deposits”, apply. The essence here is that the management and utilization of such 
deposits are to be based on unitization agreements.  The appendix specifies in detail 
the provisions such unitization agreements are to contain (article 1), and states that 
disagreements are to be promptly resolved and specifies procedures for that. Article 
                                                            
13 On the establishment of a Joint Fisheries Commission. 
14 On bilateral cooperation in fisheries management.  
15 It is common practice for such agreements to have a time frame and procedures for renewal and 
renouncement.  
16 “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic”. 
USGS Press Release 23 July 2008. http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980  
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5 of the agreement also states that exploitation of deposits straddling the boundary 
can only be initiated in accordance with the provisions of a unitization agreement.  
 These provisions build on the Norwegian experience with similar provisions in 
cooperative arrangements on management and utilization of transboundary 
petroleum deposits with other countries in the North Sea.  
 
The wider significance of the agreement 
The agreement is important in several ways. It is an important contribution to the 
evolving international law of boundary delimitation, contributing to state practice in 
this field. Also, as pointed out above, it is politically significant at the global level in 
demonstrating that such disputes - of which there are some 400 globally (Anderson, 
2006) - can be resolved in a peaceful manner. Some observers have predicted that 
unresolved boundary issues in the Arctic threaten the peace and stability in the 
region (Borgerson, 2008). But the general experience in the Arctic is that boundaries 
are settled in a peaceful manner, and in accordance with the provisions of 
international ocean law (Hoel, 2009). The case at hand here supports this view. 
 At a regional level, therefore the agreement first of all makes good on promises 
made by the coastal states to the Arctic Ocean in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration,17 
resolving a boundary issue on the basis of international ocean law. Also, the 
agreement can provide an example for the resolution of similar issues between other 
countries in the Arctic and elsewhere.18 
 At the bilateral level the establishment of the boundary paves the way for 
petroleum development in the formerly disputed area of the Barents Sea. The day 
after the entry into force of the boundary agreement, on 8 July 2011, the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate initiated seismic surveys in the Norwegian part of the 
previously disputed area, an activity that will be continued in 2012.19 As regards the 
fisheries cooperation, the boundary agreement is not likely to entail major changes 
and the existing arrangements will continue for the foreseeable future.  
 In recent years, Norway made substantial strides in settling undecided boundaries, 
entering into agreements with Denmark/Greenland on a boundary between Svalbard 
and Greenland (2006) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), an agreement with the 
Faroes and Iceland on the future delimitation of the continental shelf in an area in the 
Norwegian Sea, and making its submission to the Continental Shelf Commission on 
its extended continental shelf (2006). 
 
The agreement also sets the stage for extended scientific cooperation to address 
issues relating to integrated oceans management.  Scientific cooperation between 
research institutions in the two countries in fisheries science goes back more than 
fifty years in time (Haug et al., 2007), and is embedded in the wider international 
cooperation in marine science in the International Council for the Exploration of the 
                                                            
17 Ilulissat Declaration. http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf 
18 The one major, outstanding bilateral marine boundary between two Arctic countries is in the 
Beaufort Sea between the US and Canada. 
19 11,500 km were covered in 2011. 
http://www.npd.no/no/Nyheter/Nyheter/2011/Seismikkinnsamling-i-Barentshavet-ost-avsluttet/ In the 
state budget for 2012, 80 million NOK is dedicated to suveys in the southeastern Barents Sea. 
http://www.npd.no/no/Nyheter/Nyheter/2011/260-millionar-til-kunnskapsinnhenting-i-nord/  
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Sea. The scientific cooperation has become increasingly ecosystem oriented, 
producing comprehensive joint reports on the status of the marine environment 
(Stiansen et al., 2009). While cooperation in fisheries management is well developed, 
and cooperation on issues relating to the marine environment is evolving, 
cooperation beyond the scientific aspects of integrated oceans management is 
complicated.  
 While Norway´s sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago, provided for by the 
1920 Svalbard Treaty (Ulfstein, 1995), is not disputed, Russia has a different view 
than Norway on the exercise of the sovereignty (Pedersen, 2006). The boundary 
agreement states (article 6) that the agreement shall not prejudice rights and 
obligations under other international treaties to which both Norway and Russia are 
parties. The view has been raised, that the location of the agreed boundary to the east 
of the sector line can be read as a Russian acceptance that Svalbard “... can generate 
normal maritime zones, and that such zones are not prevented by the 1920 Svalbard 
Treaty” (Henriksen and Ulfstein 2010, 9). 
 At the domestic level, the importance of the agreement comes in two forms: 
Politically, the boundary agreement is significant in that it represents a major foreign 
policy success for the government. One of the most important foreign policy issues 
over the last decades, and the most important issue between Norway and Russia, is 
resolved. Economically, and in the longer term, the boundary agreement creates a 
more business friendly environment in the North, paving the way for increasing 
investments in petroleum-related activities in particular.  
 
Conclusions 
The land boundary between Norway and Russia was agreed in 1896 (Nielsen, 2005, 
7). 114 years later, also the marine boundary was settled. The area divided between 
the two coastal states corresponds to an area more than half the size of mainland 
Norway, rich in natural resources. In recent years the Norwegian government has 
been busy concluding marine boundaries, and the agreement with Russia represents 
the apex of these achievements.  
 In hindsight, it can be no great surprise that the boundary took time to negotiate. 
Prior to 1990, the Cold War did not provide a negotiating climate conductive to a 
resolution of the issue. At least as important, before the 2000s there was no need for 
an agreement (Kvalvik, 2004). Fisheries were well cared for with the existing 
fisheries regime that was established in the 1970s. However, with an increasing 
interest in petroleum development in the North in both countries, the need to agree 
on a boundary and develop associated agreements for how to cooperate on petroleum 
development became more imminent. Also, the increasing international interest in 
the Arctic provided a push towards a final resolution of the boundary.  
 
The resulting agreement represents a comprehensive solution to all this, defining a 
bilateral boundary on the basis of international law, continuing a relatively successful 
fisheries cooperation, and establishing a regime for how shared petroleum deposits 
are to be managed. Beyond that, the agreement is also internationally significant in 
that it demonstrates that Arctic countries work together on the basis of international 
law, setting important precedence for how similar issues can be resolved.  
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Summary: 
More than three decades in the making, the 2010 agreement between Norway and 
Russia on a bounadry in the Barents Sea establishes a boundary, continues 
cooperation in fisheries, and lays the framework for cooperation on petroleum 
deposits straddling the boundary. The importance of the boundary goes well beyond 
the Barents Sea, as it demonstrated the capability of Arctic countries to resolve issues 
in a peaceful manner on the basis of international law. The agreement settles the 
most important outstanding foreign policy issue between the two countries and opens 
up new opportunities for cooperation. The article gives a brief overview of the 
agreement, the its negotiation and its implications at various levels of governance. 
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